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COMMENTS
THE TRANS ATHLETE DILEMMA:
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF HIGH SCHOOL TRANSGENDER
STUDENT-ATHLETE POLICIES
MICHAEL J. LENZI*
Typically, high schools offer separate teams for boys and girls, but the
increasing number of young people openly identifying as transgender (“trans”)
has complicated this sex-segregated approach. High school athletic associations
across the country have adopted varied regulations regarding the eligibility of trans
athletes: restrictive policies require trans students to compete on teams corresponding
to their sex at birth without exception; fully inclusive policies allow all trans students
to compete on teams consistent with their gender identity; and partially inclusive
policies permit trans boys to play on all-boy teams without restriction but require
trans girls to undergo specific medical interventions before playing on all-girl teams.
Plaintiffs challenging these policies will likely rely on Title IX of the
Educational Amendments Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under either claim, a high school athletic association would need to
establish that classifying trans students by their sex assigned at birth rather than
their gender identity—or vice versa—furthers a legitimate government interest.
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Restrictive policies fail rational basis review because forcing female-to-male
(FTM) trans boys to compete against girls ironically undermines notions of fair
play. Additionally, male-to-female (MTF) trans girls who have undergone a year of
cross-gender hormone treatments enjoy no significant competitive edge over their
cisgender girl peers. Fully inclusive policies are constitutionally valid because
creating a welcoming educational environment for trans students is a legitimate
state objective and an athletic policy that allows trans players to compete on
teams consistent with their gender identity is rationally related to that goal.
Finally, partially inclusive policies, which require MTF trans girls to undergo a
year of hormone therapy before competing on all-girl teams, are valid because a state
athletic association may rationally determine that, without medical intervention,
trans girls have a competitive advantage and may endanger fellow female players.
Although partially inclusive athletic policies are legally permissible, high
school athletic associations should pursue fully inclusive models that validate
the dignity of trans students.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2017, Mack Beggs, a transgender boy,1 won the Texas
high school girls’ state wrestling championship amidst an uproar of
controversy.2 Beggs, who had undergone medically prescribed
hormone therapy since October 2015 to aid in his transition, requested
to compete against other boys, but the University Interscholastic
League (UIL), the state officiating body that regulates Texas
interscholastic sports, refused his request.3 The official UIL policy
restricts an athlete to only competing on single-sex teams that
correspond to the sex indicated on the student’s birth certificate.4 A
parent of a competitor filed a lawsuit alleging that Beggs’s testosterone
treatments provided him an unfair advantage over his female
opponents, hazarding the bizarre position that “Beggs, who has
identified as a boy for about two years, is a girl, but somehow not
enough of a girl to wrestle against girls.”5 Although a Texas judge
dismissed the lawsuit,6 the Beggs controversy reveals how policies based

1. Beggs was born female but now identifies as male. See infra Section I.B
(discussing transgender identity).
2. Christina Cauterucci, The Trans Boy Who Won the Texas Girls’ Wrestling Title Exposes
the Illogic of Anti-Trans Policy, SLATE (Feb. 27, 2017, 3:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/xx_factor/2017/02/27/the_texas_trans_boy_forced_to_wrestle_girls_exposes
_the_illogic_of_anti.html.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Michael Florek, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against UIL that Sought to Ban
Transgender Wrestler from Competing, DALLAS NEWS: SPORTSDAY (Apr. 25, 2017),
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on strict sex binaries often lead to illogical results when confronted
with the reality of fluid conceptions of gender identity.7
On the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, some states, like
Connecticut, allow transgender student-athletes to compete on teams
consistent with their gender identity irrespective of their sex assigned
at birth.8 Andraya Yearwood, a fifteen-year-old transgender girl,9
outclassed her female competition at the 2017 Connecticut State Track
and Field Championship, finishing first in both the 100-meter dash
and 200-meter dash.10 Some of her competitors voiced frustration,
believing that Yearwood’s male body—she has never undergone any
hormone therapy that would suppress her natural testosterone levels—
provided her a biological advantage in a sport based on physical
strength and speed.11 While the Beggs situation shows the foolishness
of adhering to strict sex-based classifications in all circumstances, the
controversy surrounding Yearwood exposes the possible folly of
progressive policies that turn a blind eye to the reality of inherent
biological differences between males and females.
This Comment analyzes the potential constitutional challenges to
various state regulations regarding inclusion of transgender studentathletes on single-sex interscholastic sports teams. Generally, public
schools offer separate boys’ and girls’ teams for their sports programs,
but the increasing number of young athletes identifying as transgender
complicates this practice.12 State officials must now craft athletic policies
that recognize the dignity of transgender adolescents but still promote
the goals of fair competition and student safety.13 Currently, state high
https://sportsday.dallasnews.com/high-school/high-schools/2017/04/25/judgedismisses-lawsuit-uil-sought-ban-transgender-wrestler-competing.
7. See infra Section I.B (explaining the distinction between sex and gender).
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-15c (2017) (ordering Connecticut public schools to
provide students “an equal opportunity to participate” in school activities “without
discrimination on account of . . . gender identity or expression”).
9. Yearwood was born male but now identifies as female. See infra Section I.B
(discussing transgender identity).
10. Jeff Jacobs, As We Rightfully Applaud Yearwood, We Must Acknowledge Many Questions
Remain, HARTFORD COURANT (June 1, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.courant.com/
sports/hc-jacobs-column-yearwood-transgender-0531-20170530-column.html.
11. Id.
12. See Jan Hoffman, Estimate of U.S. Transgender Population Doubles to 1.4 Million
Adults, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/health/
transgender-population.html (explaining that, while only 0.6% of the adult
population in America—or 1.4 million people—identifies as transgender, that number
is twice what it was five years ago).
13. See infra Section II.C.
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school athletic associations implement a wide range of regulations
regarding the eligibility of transgender student-athletes to compete on
single-sex teams.14 This Comment classifies these varied policies into three
general categories: restrictive, fully inclusive, and partially inclusive.15
This Comment argues that restrictive policies requiring transgender
students to participate on sports teams consistent with their sex
assigned at birth, without exception, fail to survive rational basis review
and are, therefore, unconstitutional. Preventing female-to-male
(FTM) transgender boys from playing on boys’ teams serves no rational
purpose.16 Concerns about safety are paternalistic, and concerns about
fair play are illogical.17 Furthermore, requiring male-to-female (MTF)
transgender girls to play on boys’ teams in all circumstances is
impermissibly overinclusive.18 Transgender girls who have received crossgender hormone treatments for more than a year pose no credible safety
risk to female opponents and enjoy no significant competitive advantage.
Any policy discriminating against transgender girls who are
undergoing hormone therapy likely reflects unjustifiable animus.
However, under rational basis review, a rule that requires a MTF
transgender girl to undergo hormone therapy for one year before
competing against other girls should survive a constitutional challenge.19
Such a regulation is rationally related to the legitimate state goals of
promoting competitive fairness and ensuring student safety.
Part I examines the history and purpose of single-sex sports in public
schools and explores how the inclusion of transgender student-athletes
poses new legal complications for the current sex-segregated
approach. Part II details the various state policies currently concerning
transgender high school student-athletes, focusing on restrictive, fully
inclusive, and partially inclusive models. Part III establishes the legal
framework that plaintiffs would likely use to contest these state
regulations, analyzing how courts have interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act to provide relief to transgender
individuals in the past. Part IV argues that transgender student-athlete
policies only need to withstand rational basis review. Finally, Part V

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section I.B (defining female-to-male (FTM) transgender boy).
See infra Section V.B.1.
See infra Section I.B (defining male-to-female (MTF) transgender girl).
See infra Section V.B.3.
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argues that state policies that restrict students to competing on singlesex teams consistent with their sex assigned at birth, without exception,
are constitutionally invalid; however, rules that require transgender
girls to undergo specific forms of medical intervention before playing
on all-girl teams likely pass constitutional muster.
This Comment concludes by explaining that although both fully
inclusive and partially inclusive policies are consistent with the
Constitution and Title IX, high school athletic associations need to deeply
consider whether they want to prioritize notions of fair competition
over acknowledgment of the dignity and well-being of transgender
girls who may be harmed by any policy short of full inclusion.
I.

TRANSGENDER ATHLETES AND SEX-SEGREGATED
HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS

This Section examines the history and purpose of single-sex sports
teams in public schools—focusing both on cases where courts have
upheld sex-segregated policies and cases where courts have struck
down sex-based exclusions. Sections I.B and I.C further explore how
the increased visibility of trans athletes disrupts the traditional gender
paradigm underpinning interscholastic athletics. Finally, this Section
concludes by explaining the importance of inclusion for the trans
athletes at the mercy of these regulations.
A.

History and Objective of Sex Segregation in High School Sports

Throughout American history, sports were traditionally the domain
of boys and men.20 During the nineteenth century, religious
institutions, schools, and businesses organized and promoted team
sports—especially football—as a means to engender “masculine
qualities such as physicality, aggression, and dominance in male
participants.”21 The few athletic opportunities available to female
athletes tended to emphasize “fitness and socializing rather than
competition,” and sports for girls and women often had different rules
based on stereotypical notions of female physical inferiority.22

20. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Transgender Student-Athletes and Sex-Segregated Sport:
Developing Policies of Inclusion for Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 21 SETON HALL
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 4 (2011).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1, 4 (noting society’s limitation of the scope of women “sporting
practices,” including requiring “modest and restrictive attire”); see also Cape v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 563 F.2d 793, 794–95 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curium)
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The state of female athletics forever changed in 1972 when Congress
passed Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, which mandated
that educational institutions receiving federal funds may not
discriminate against students “on the basis of sex.”23 Title IX ensured
that female students had equal opportunity and funding to participate
in athletics, but the implementing regulations instituted a separatebut-equal framework for female sports, explicitly authorizing schools
to sponsor separate teams for members of each sex.24 The regulations
stipulate that a school may even operate a single-sex team without
offering a corresponding team for the opposite sex if (1) the sport is a
contact sport or (2) athletic opportunities for members of the
excluded sex have not been previously limited.25
Under a strict reading of the regulation, a school that sponsors a
boys’ football team but no girls’ football team is justified in prohibiting a
female student from trying-out for football. Similarly, a school that
operates separate-sex teams for badminton—a noncontact sport—would
be equally justified in prohibiting a female athlete from trying-out for the
more competitive boys’ badminton team regardless of her skill level.
Some feminist legal scholars have criticized Title IX, arguing that
the legislation legitimizes unfounded sex-based discrimination and
(holding that the modified rules made for girls’ basketball that “call for six instead of
five players on each team, impose half-court restrictions, and permit only forwards to
shoot” are valid because the rules are reasonably tailored to the limited physical
characteristics and capabilities of girls).
23. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–82 (2012).
24. Title IX states in part:
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another
person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no
recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of
each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the
activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or
sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or
sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic
opportunities for members of that sex have previously been limited, members
of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the
sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part, contact sports
include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other
sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)–(b) (2017).
25. Id. § 106.41(b).
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brands girls as inferior to boys,26 much like the Supreme Court’s
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson27 maintained racial segregation with its
“separate but equal” accommodations requirement.28 Most courts,
however, have upheld Title IX’s sex-segregated framework for
interscholastic sports to protect athletic opportunities for girls.29 When
school athletic policies are at odds with that end, courts routinely strike
down sex-based exclusions. For instance, courts typically permit
physically talented girls to play on boys’ teams for both contact and
noncontact sports as long as the school does not offer a corresponding
girls’ team.30 Courts are reluctant to enforce a school athletic policy
that completely bars girls from playing certain sports.31 For example,
in Darrin v. Gould,32 the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated a
policy that prevented the two Darrin sisters from trying out for the
Wishkah Valley High School boys’ football team.33 The court held that
such a prohibition impermissibly discriminated against the Darrin girls
“on account of their sex.”34 The ruling in Darrin is consistent with
similar rulings that reject the unfounded and paternalistic claim that
prohibiting a talented girl from playing a contact sport with boys is for

26. See EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY
SEPARATE IS NOT EQUAL IN SPORTS xi (2008) (“By condoning sex segregation in contact
sports, Title IX ended up reinforcing the assumption that girls couldn’t—or
shouldn’t—play with the boys.”); Nancy Leong, Against Women’s Sports, WASH. UNIV. L.
REV. 5 (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2923503 (arguing that sports
leagues should operate on the assumption that participation should be coed).
27. 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494–95 (1954).
28. Id. at 551–52 (upholding a Louisiana statute that required railroads to provide
separate-but-equal accommodations for white and black passengers).
29. See Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t
would require blinders to ignore that the motivation for promulgation of the
regulation on athletics was the historic emphasis on boys’ athletic programs to the
exclusion of girls’ athletic programs in high schools as well as colleges.”).
30. See, e.g., Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973)
(tennis and cross country); Saint v. Neb. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 684 F. Supp. 626, 627
(D. Neb. 1988) (wrestling); Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020,
1021–22 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (eighth-grade football); Carnes v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletics Ass’n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (baseball); Darrin v. Gould,
540 P.2d 882, 883 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (high school football).
31. See, e.g., Darrin, 540 P.2d at 892–93 (holding that a blanket rule prohibiting girls
from playing on boys’ teams for contact sports is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
32. 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
33. Id. at 883–84.
34. Id. at 893.
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her own good.35 In these cases, the female plaintiffs are aware of their
physical abilities and are making an informed decision to compete
against boys.36 Furthermore, the Darrin court concluded that safety
concerns are disingenuous because schools do not prevent smaller,
weaker boys who are prone to injury from trying-out for contact sports
against bigger, stronger boys.37
Courts are conflicted about whether girls are entitled to try-out for
the more competitive boys’ team when their school offers a girls’ team
for that particular sport. Title IX expressly allows schools to operate
sex-segregated sports teams,38 but schools must implement Title IX in
a manner consistent with the Constitution.39 In O’Connor v. Board of
Education,40 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
upheld a policy that prevented Karen O’Connor, a talented female
basketball player, from trying-out for the sixth-grade boys’ basketball
team because her school provided a sixth-grade team for girls.41 The
court reasoned that without sex-segregated teams, boys would
dominate and deny girls an equal opportunity to participate in
interscholastic sports.42 The court conceded that the policy was
illogical as applied to O’Connor, but it held a valid policy only needs
to be reasonable in general, not in every specific case.43
Contrastingly, in Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass’n,44 a Pennsylvania state court concluded that relegating all female
students to the girls’ team, regardless of ability, constitutes impermissible
35. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 350–51 (1st Cir. 1975)
(concluding that safety concerns are unsubstantiated and not a rational basis for
excluding girls from Little League Baseball).
36. See Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1028–29 (W.D. Mo.
1983) (explaining that an average girl may have a higher potential for injury than the
average boy, but not all girls are average).
37. See Darrin, 540 P.2d at 892 (noting that smaller, weaker boys could try-out for
their high school’s football team).
38. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2017).
39. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255–56 (2009) (holding
that Title IX does not preclude an Equal Protection Clause challenge alleging
unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools).
40. 545 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
41. Id. at 378, 384.
42. Id. at 379.
43. Id. at 381 (“If the classification is reasonable in substantially all of its
applications, I do not believe that the general rule can be said to be unconstitutional
simply because it appears arbitrary in an individual case.”) (quoting O’Connor v. Bd.
of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1306 (1980)).
44. 334 A.2d 839 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
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sex discrimination.45 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenged
the constitutionality of a provision of the Pennsylvania Interscholastic
Athletic Association’s bylaws, mandating that “[g]irls shall not
compete or practice against boys in any athletic contest.”46 The court
held that such a policy was invalid with respect to sports for which no
girls’ team exists.47 For those “boy” sports, all girls, even girls more skilled
than their male classmates, are effectively barred from participating
due to their sex.48 In dicta, the court further reasoned that even when
schools offer separate teams for boys and girls for the same sport, if the
school restricts an exceptionally talented girl to the girls’ team, she
“still may be denied the right to play at that level of competition which
[her] ability might otherwise permit . . . solely because of her sex.”49 The
court recognized that preventing girls from playing against boys
undermines the purpose of Title IX,50 ensuring that female students have
equitable access to the educational benefits of competitive athletics.
Following that reasoning, courts are most likely to uphold sexsegregated athletic policies when boys sue to gain positions on girls’
teams.51 Because the Department of Education drafted the Title IX
implementation regulations to increase opportunities for female
athletes, courts have been unsympathetic to male plaintiffs relying on
the statute.52 High schools may reasonably prevent boys from tryingout for girls’ teams because boys have physical advantages that would
be unfair to opposing players and would limit female participation.53
In B.C. v. Board of Education,54 a New Jersey appellate court upheld a
45. Id. at 842.
46. Id. at 840.
47. Id. at 842.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 841 (addressing a challenge to the Equal Rights Amendment in the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which, like Title IX, prohibits the “denial or abridgment of
equality of rights because of sex”) (citing PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28).
51. See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 169 (3d Cir. 1993) (field
hockey); Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1127 (9th Cir. 1982)
(volleyball); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1061 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (field
hockey); Forte v. Bd. of Educ., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (volleyball).
52. See Forte, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 324 (“[The] policy of preventing male participation
in girls’ inter-scholastic teams is a discernable and permissible means toward
redressing disparate treatment of female students in scholastic athletic programs.”).
53. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131 (concluding that, due to average physiological
differences, “males would displace females to a substantial extent” if boys could try-out
for the all-girl volleyball team).
54. 531 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
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state athletic policy that prevented a high school boy from playing on
his school’s all-girl field hockey team even though the school did not
sponsor a field hockey team for boys.55 The court explained that
because boys have a real physical advantage over girls, New Jersey’s sexsegregated athletics policy necessarily “prevents males from
dominating and displacing females from meaningful participation in
available athletic opportunities.”56
Notably, there are two recorded instances in which courts have
permitted boys to participate on girls’ teams.57 In both cases, the holdings
were limited to situations where schools did not sponsor a boys’ team for
the sport in question.58 For example, in Gomes v. Rhode Island
Interscholastic League,59 the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode
Island permitted a boy to play on an all-girl volleyball team, but the court
recognized that typically a sex-segregated sports policy is desirable.60
Generally, courts acknowledge that Congress passed Title IX to
increase educational opportunities for girls and women. As such,
courts tend to invalidate sex-segregated athletic policies when those
policies deny girls the opportunity to play traditionally masculine
sports; however, courts will enforce those same policies to prevent male
plaintiffs from ruining the integrity of female athletics.
B.

Distinguishing Sex from Gender and Understanding
Transgender Identity

The increasing number of young athletes identifying as transgender
has forced education policymakers to reexamine the social purpose
and legal justifications for sex-segregated sports teams. For this
Comment, “transgender” refers to an “individual whose gender identity
55. Id. at 1061, 1066.
56. Id. at 1065.
57. See Attorney General v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 284,
296 (Mass. 1979) (holding that a complete bar on boys competing on girls’ teams
violates the Equal Rights Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution because the
policy is not narrowly tailored to safety concerns or providing athletic opportunities to
girls); Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.R.I. 1979)
(concluding that because boys have been denied the opportunity to play volleyball,
boys must be permitted to play on an all-girl team if the school does not sponsor a
male volleyball team), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 1979).
58. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d at 296.
59. 469 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 1979).
60. 469 F. Supp. at 666 (stating that “[s]eparate but equal volleyball teams do
appear the most advantageous athletic approach” because of the physical differences
between boys and girls).
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(one’s internal psychological identification as a boy/man or
girl/woman) does not match the person’s sex at birth.”61 An FTM
transgender boy is a young person who was born with a female body
but identifies as a male, and an MTF transgender girl is a young person
who was born with a male body but identifies as a female.62 “Cisgender”
refers to an individual who exclusively identifies as his or her sex
assigned at birth—someone who is not transgender.63
Although “gender” and “sex” are often used interchangeably, the
two terms have distinct meanings.64 “Sex” describes an individual’s
biological characteristics (e.g., chromosomes, hormone profiles, and
internal and external sex organs), while “gender” refers to an
individual’s personal identification as male or female based on internal
awareness.65 Trans proclivities are deeply rooted and may present in
children as young as two or three years old.66 Some trans individuals
seek hormone therapy and gender-reassignment surgery to change
their bodies to better reflect their gender identity, but others simply
choose to live their lives as a gender different from their sex assigned
at birth without medical intervention.67
The steps an individual may take toward transitioning are often
dependent upon age and physical development.68
The World
Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) has
established different medical protocols for transitioning dependent
upon a trans person’s age.69 For young children, WPATH recommends a
purely social transition free from medical intervention.70 For children
approaching puberty, a doctor may choose to prescribe hormone blockers
61. PAT GRIFFIN & HELEN J. CARROLL, ON THE TEAM: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR
TRANSGENDER STUDENT ATHLETES, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 9 (2010),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCLR_TransStudentAthlete%2B(2).pdf.
Throughout this Comment, the shorthand for “transgender” is “trans.”
62. Id.
63. GLAAD
Media
Reference
Guide
–
Transgender,
GLAAD,
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
Throughout this Comment, the shorthand for “cisgender” is “cis.”
64. Jill Pilgrim et al., Far from the Finish Line: Transexualism and Athletic Competition,
13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 495, 498 (2003).
65. Id. at 497–98.
66. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 12–13.
67. GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 9.
68. Id. at 13–14.
69. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 11, 17–
21 (7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE].
70. Id. at 17.
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to delay the onset of puberty.71 For postpubescent adolescents, a doctor
may prescribe cross-gender hormone treatments and in some cases may
approve chest reconstruction surgery for trans boys.72 Importantly, most
doctors advise against gender reassignment surgery for patients under
eighteen, and most insurers refuse to cover the procedure for minors.73
C.

The Dilemma of Transgender Athletes

Trans athletes pose a dilemma to the traditional model of
interscholastic athletics because the sex-segregated approach is
predicated upon the assertion that males and females are biologically
different. Males, on average, have objective physical advantages over
females.74 Males have longer arms, bigger and stronger legs, and more
muscle fiber.75 Although no significant physical differences exist
between boys and girls prior to puberty, the physical disparities
between the sexes become more pronounced once students enter high
school.76 For example, the 2017 Maryland High School Class 4A Track
and Field Championship highlights the extent of these sex-based
distinctions. In the 100-meter dash, the three fastest girls ran an
average time of 12.22 seconds, while the three fastest boys ran an
average time of 10.88 seconds.77 The three top girl long jumpers
jumped an average distance of eighteen feet, one inch, compared to
an average distance of twenty-one feet, five inches for the top three
boys.78 In both events, every male competitor—except for those
disqualified—outperformed every female competitor.79 Without
separate events for each sex, female sprinters and jumpers would not
have a realistic opportunity to compete for a state championship.

71. Id. at 18–19.
72. Id. at 20–21.
73. Id. at 21; see also Anemona Hartocollis, How Young Is Too Young to Seek Gender
Reassignment?, HERALD-TRIBUNE (July 7, 2015), http://health.heraldtribune.com/
2015/07/07/how-young-is-too-young-to-seek-gender-reassignment (“While no law
prohibits minors from receiving sex-change hormones or even surgery, insurers have
generally refused to extend coverage for these procedures to those under 18.”).
74. See Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for
Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 286 (2013).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 287.
77. MD. PUB. SECONDARY SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, MARYLAND STATE CHAMPIONSHIPS
RESULTS 1, 13 (2017), http://www.mpssaa.org/assets/1/6/T_F_4A_Final_Results_17.pdf.
78. Id. at 10, 21–22.
79. Id. at 1–24.
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Erin Buzuvis, a preeminent scholar on transgender athletes, argues
that the perceived competitive advantage males have over females is
overstated. She notes that the reported physical differences between the
sexes reflect averages, not categorical distinctions.80 Furthermore, skill
and talent, which are the most important factors when determining an
advantage in sports, are not always related to size and strength.81
Buzuvis’s assertion that not all boys possess physical advantages over all
girls is correct, but the categorical distinctions between the sexes are
pronounced enough that a policy that fully embraces sex-integrated
high school athletics would disenfranchise young women. Some
especially talented girls could compete against their male peers, but
many girls of average size and strength would be discouraged from
participating in athletics. Sex-segregated teams may not be necessary
for interscholastic sports that are predominantly skill-based, like
bowling or archery, but boys have an undue competitive advantage in
most other sports, which privilege body size, speed, and strength.
Before high school athletic associations devise regulations regarding
transgender athletes, they must openly acknowledge the inherent
biological differences between males and females. A trans girl, who
has a male body that regularly produces testosterone, has a physical
advantage over a cis girl whose body produces significantly less
testosterone.82 However, when a trans girl receives cross-gender
hormone therapy, the treatments greatly reduce any former biological
edge.83 Hormone treatments for MTF trans girls increase body fat,
decrease muscle mass, and may even cause a slight loss in height.84
After only one year of cross-gender hormone therapy, a trans girl will
have estrogen and testosterone levels similar to the average cis girl.85
Yet some physiological differences persist even after a trans girl has
undergone hormone therapy. Her “male” skeletal structure—
80. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 35–36.
81. Id. at 37–38; see also Leong, supra note 26, at 36–38 (noting that men have no
inherent competitive advantage in sports based primarily on skill like skeet shooting
or in extreme endurance sports like ultra-marathons and the Iditarod).
82. See Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 38.
83. Id. at 38–39; see also Joanna Harper, Race Times for Transgender Athletes,
6 J. SPORTING CULTURES & IDENTITIES 1, 2, 8 (2015) (conducting the first ever study
measuring the performance of transgender athletes and finding that for distance
runners in masters (over forty years old) track meets, “transgender women run
distance races at approximately the same level, for their respective gender, both before
and after gender transition”).
84. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 39.
85. Id.
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including basic height, hip structure, arms, hands, legs, and feet—will
remain unchanged.86 A trans girl’s comparatively larger stature may
be an advantage in sports like basketball and volleyball that favor height
and hand size.87 These differences are less pronounced for a trans girl
who began cross-gender hormone therapy as a teenager before her male
skeletal structure fully developed. Concerns regarding competitive
fairness are especially baseless for MTF trans girls who were placed on
hormone blockers before they reached puberty and never developed
male secondary sex characteristics. Unlike hormone therapy, there is
currently no evidence that suggests gender reassignment surgery has a
demonstrable impact on athletic performance.88
Obviously, fairness concerns are less of an issue when trans boys with
female bodies seek the opportunity to compete against cis boys.89 Even
FTM trans boys who regularly take testosterone treatments enjoy no
discernable physical advantage over cis boys.90 A trans boy who takes
testosterone may technically be in violation of a school’s doping or antidrug rules, but a policy granting a medical exception for a student
receiving prescribed testosterone treatments—assuming his testosterone
levels remain in the typical range for a cis boy—is a commonsense solution.91

86. Maddie Deutsch, Information on Estrogen Hormone Therapy, UNIV. OF CAL. S.F.,
https://transcare.ucsf.edu/article/information-estrogen-hormone-therapy
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2018) (explaining that any slight loss in height a trans woman may notice
after undergoing hormone therapy is not due to skeletal changes but “due to changes
in the ligaments and muscles of your feet”).
87. But see Katelyn Burns, What Actually Happens when a Trans Athlete Transitions,
VICE SPORTS (May 4, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/
vv95a4/what-actually-happens-when-a-trans-athlete-transitions (arguing that a trans
girl’s larger skeletal stature may actually be a disadvantage due to her loss in quickness,
as the reduction in testosterone results in a smaller motor powering a larger body).
Also, some trans girls are smaller than the average cis girl, and some cis girls are larger
than the average cis boy. See id. These arguments notwithstanding, athletes with larger
bodies tend to enjoy an advantage in physical sports.
88. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 40–41.
89. See Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the Arizona Interscholastic Association had a substantial interest in
preventing the decrease of athletic opportunities for females because males have a
physiological undue advantage when competing against females).
90. Pilgrim et al., supra note 64, at 531.
91. Id.
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Potential Benefits of Athletic Participation for Transgender Students

Roughly 8 million students participate in and enjoy the physical,
mental, and academic benefits associated with interscholastic athletics.92
Playing sports reduces an adolescent’s risk of heart disease and obesity,
while also establishing a healthy exercise routine that may persist into
adulthood.93 Sports promote mental health, leading to lower rates of
depression and anxiety.94 Student-athletes also tend to have increased
rates of school attendance and better grades.95 Finally, high school
athletics instill the values of dedication, teamwork, and sportsmanship.96
Transgender students are an especially vulnerable population,97 and
they deserve equal access to the benefits of high school athletics. Trans
students may feel marginalized and isolated from their school
community, and sports can provide a sense of belonging.98 When a
single-gender team openly accepts a trans player, the student’s gender
identity is powerfully validated. Matt Dawkins, a trans high school
sprinter from New Jersey, sacrificed potential scholarships to run
women’s college track to participate on the boys’ team for his high
school.99 Matt knew that fully living as a male—being “in the bro
group”—was more important to his self-worth than being the fastest
runner on the track.100 For many trans students, trans-inclusive policies
are a matter of life and death. A staggering forty-one percent of

92. High School Sports Participation Increases for 27th Consecutive Year, NAT’L FED’N OF
STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASS’NS (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.nfhs.org/articles/highschool-sports-participation-increases-for-27th-consecutive-year (noting that 7,868,900
high school students across the United States participated in interscholastic sports
during the 2015–2016 school year).
93. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 46 (explaining that studies have found links between
physical activities and reduced risk of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease); SkinnerThompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 297 (describing how sports participation
develops long-term habits).
94. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 297.
95. Id. at 298.
96. Id.
97. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 48; see also Johanna Olson-Kennedy, Mental Health
Disparities Among Transgender Youth: Rethinking the Role of Professionals, 170 JAMA
PEDIATRICS 423, 423 (2016) (noting that transgender youth report
“[d]ispropotionatley high levels of depression, anxiety, substance use, social isolation,
self-harm, and suicidality”).
98. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 48–49.
99. Matt Dawkins’ Incredible Journey, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/video/
clip?id=18326395 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
100. Id.
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transgender individuals attempt suicide,101 but trans youth who have a
strong support system are eighty-two percent less likely to self-harm.102
Nondiscriminatory athletic policies have the potential to quite literally
save the lives of trans individuals.
II. CURRENT POLICIES FOR INCORPORATING TRANSGENDER ATHLETES
INTO SEX-SEGREGATED SPORTS
This Section details the current trans athlete inclusion policies of
different sports governing bodies, focusing on the Olympic model, the
college model, and the regulations of various state high school athletic
associations.
A.

Olympic Model

The International Olympic Committee (IOC)103 drafted its first
transgender inclusive policy in 2003.104 Prior to that, the IOC required
sex-verification testing for all female athletes.105 Instead of uncovering
cases of gender fraud, sex-verification tests typically resulted in
humiliating and unfairly excluding women with intersex conditions.106
In fact, many athletes only became aware of an intersex condition

101. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. AND NAT’L
GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE 2 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/
downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf.
102. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, The Influence of State Laws on the Mental Health of Sexual
Minority Youth, 171 JAMA PEDIATRICS 322, 322 (2017) (“Stigma is one of the most
frequently hypothesized risk factors for explaining sexual orientation disparities in
suicide outcomes.”); Brynn Tannehill, The Truth About Transgender Suicide, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 14, 2015, 4:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brynn-tannehill/thetruth-about-transgend_b_8564834.html.
103. See MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 269–70 (4th ed.
2017) (explaining that the IOC, an international non-governmental not-for-profit
organization, is the supreme authority concerning the Olympic Games, but the
International Olympic Committee must rely on the agreement of the various international
sports federations and National Olympic Committees to enforce its decisions).
104. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 22.
105. Id. at 21.
106. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 289; see also GRIFFIN & CARROLL,
supra note 61, at 9–10 (explaining that people with intersex conditions are born with
mixed sexual characteristics). Although minors with intersex conditions deserve
recognition, respect, and equal access to interscholastic athletics, it is beyond the scope
of this Comment to examine policies concerning how to integrate these adolescents’
equitably into the current single-sex framework of high school athletics.
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because of the testing.107 In 2004, the IOC adopted the first modern
policy allowing transgender individuals to compete in athletic
competitions consistent with their gender identity.108 The rigid
guidelines required that transgender athletes undergo gender
reassignment surgery, take cross-gender hormones consistently for two
years after surgery, and obtain official government recognition of their
altered gender status before they could participate in events consistent
with their new gender identity.109
In 2015, the IOC revised its policy to better align with contemporary
notions of gender. The current modified guidelines, which the IOC
recommends international sports federations adopt but does not
officially mandate, no longer require gender reassignment surgery.110
According to the IOC policy, an FTM trans man is “eligible to compete
in the male category without restriction”; however, an MTF trans woman
can only compete in a women’s event after completing hormone
therapy.111 The IOC requires that a trans woman maintain testosterone
levels at a suppressed rate “for at least [twelve] months prior to her first
competition.”112 Since a trans woman typically needs to take hormones
consistently for at least one year before her testosterone levels are
sufficiently suppressed, the rule is essentially a two-year requirement.113

107. See Leong, supra note 26, at 26–27 (detailing the case of eighteen-year-old
South African sprinter Caster Semenya, who was publicly embarrassed after a tabloid
leaked the results of a sex-verification test that revealed her latent intersex condition).
108. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 21.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Chelsea Shrader, Comment, Uniform Rules: Addressing the Disparate Rules that
Deny Student-Athletes the Opportunity to Participate in Sports According to Gender Identity,
51 U. RICH. L. REV. 637, 659–60 (2017).
111. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., IOC CONSENSUS MEETING ON SEX REASSIGNMENT AND
HYPERANDROGENISM
2
(2015),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/
Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2015-11_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_
sex_reassignment_and_hyperandrogenism-en.pdf.
112. Id. at 2.
113. See IOC Rules Transgender Athletes Can Take Part in Olympics Without Surgery,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2016, 8:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jan/
25/ioc-rules-transgender-athletes-can-take-part-in-olympics-without-surgery
(explaining that a trans woman may have to undergo hormone therapy for one or two
years before the level of male testosterone in her blood falls below the IOC required
10 nanomols per liter threshold).
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College Athletics Model

In 2011, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a
private association of member colleges and universities,114 adopted a
trans-athlete inclusion policy similar to that of the IOC. Before 2011,
the NCAA policy stipulated that trans athletes must compete on the
single-sex team consistent with their state recognized sex.115 But
because states have varying policies for changing sex identification on
birth certificates and driver’s licenses, this regulation led to the
application of inconsistent standards.116 The current trans-inclusive
NCAA policy establishes different criteria for trans men and trans
women.117 An FTM trans man can compete on a men’s team at any
point; however, a trans man can only compete on a women’s team if
he is not undergoing testosterone treatment.118 An MTF trans woman
can compete on the men’s team without restriction; however, a trans
woman can only compete on a women’s team after completing one
calendar year of cross-gender hormone therapy.119 Some trans women
may opt to apply for a medical hardship waiver, known as a “medical
redshirt,” to avoid losing a year of eligibility during the required twelve
months of hormone therapy.120
114. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 103, at 107, 171 (explaining that NCAA member
institutions promulgate extensive rules to maintain academic integrity, amateurism,
and competitive fairness to which all voluntary member institutions must abide or risk
sanctions); see also NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194–95 (1988) (holding that the
NCAA is not a state actor and the NCAA’s rules enforcement processes are not subject
to constitutional constraints).
115. Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 23; Anne L. DeMartini, Thirty-Five Years after Richards
v. USTA: The Continued Significance of Transgender Athletes’ Participation in Sport, in SPORT
AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INTERSECTIONS 111 (Samuel O. Regalado &
Sarah K. Fields eds., 2014) (commenting that, before 2011, the NCAA’s position on
trans student-athletes required athletes to compete according to the gender
designated on state identification).
116. See Buzuvis, supra note 20, at 23–24 (“This patchwork of state laws creates the
possibility that an NCAA member institution could—consistent with NCAA policy—
field a women’s team that includes an athlete from Massachusetts who identifies as
female but has not undergone sex reassignment surgery, but not a similarly situated
athlete from Rhode Island.”).
117. PAT GRIFFIN & HELLEN CARROLL, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENTATHLETES 13 (2010), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_44693cb5d779311
cabc005d959e9486d.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Shrader, supra note 110, at 662; see also Bylaws, Article 14, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/bylawView?id=8900 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2018) (stating that the Transgender Female Exception in section 14.2.2.3 of the
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High School Model

High school athletic associations, comprised of representatives from
public and private secondary schools, draft and implement statewide
interscholastic athletics regulations.121 School boards and local
officials may also adopt rules that apply to specific school districts.122
High school athletic associations are considered state actors because
these organizations are pervasively “entwined” with the state.123
Currently, seven state athletic associations have no recorded
guidelines regarding the integration of trans student-athletes, and the
state associations that have addressed the issue have drafted widely
varying regulations.124 These varied transgender student-athlete
policies have been grouped into three classifications: restrictive, fully
inclusive, and partially inclusive.
1. Restrictive policies
Restrictive policies limit trans student-athletes to competing on
single-sex sports teams that correspond to their sex assigned at birth.
For example, in Alabama, “participation in athletics [is] determined
by the gender indicated on the student-athlete’s certified certificate of
birth.”125 A trans athlete in Alabama is essentially barred from
participating on a sports team that aligns with his or her gender
identity because altering a birth certificate in Alabama requires an

bylaws provides that a trans female may be eligible for a two-semester extension if the studentathlete uses testosterone suppression treatment or surgical intervention for two semesters).
121. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 103, at 22–23.
122. Id. at 23.
123. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298–
302 (holding that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was entwined
with the state because eighty-four percent of the Association schools are public, public
school officials act as Association representatives, student participation in sports
sponsored by the Association satisfy state physical education requirements, and some
of the ministerial staff are treated as state employees and receive public pensions). But
see MITTEN ET AL., supra note 103, at 24 (cautioning that the holding in Brentwood was
fact-specific and “may not be determinative as to all high school athletic associations,
given that the history, structure, and activities of high school athletic associations and
the degree of public or state involvement differ from state to state”).
124. High
School
Transgender
Athlete
Policies,
TRANSATHLETE.COM,
https://www.transathlete.com/k-12 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (describing the
transgender-athlete guidelines for various state high school athletic associations).
125. 2012–13 CASE STUDIES: ALABAMA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
(AHSAA) 14 (2012–2013), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_87536da66cad
4d6195ae056a573e67da.pdf.
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irreversible “surgical procedure”126 that doctors advise against for
minors. Texas, Mack Beggs’s home state, has a similar policy: athletes
are restricted to participating on single-sex teams that are consistent
with the sex indicated on their birth certificate.127 Although Texas
does not require gender reassignment surgery, the process to alter
one’s birth certificate in Texas is expensive and time-consuming.128
Ultimately, birth certificate alteration is granted or withheld at the
discretion of an individual judge.129 For these two states, and others with
similar restrictive policies,130 trans athletes are effectively prevented from
playing on single-sex sports teams that match their gender identity.
2.

Fully inclusive policies
In stark contrast, fully inclusive policies allow trans student-athletes
to participate on single-sex sports teams consistent with their gender
identity in virtually all circumstances. For example, in Connecticut,
where Andraya Yearwood currently runs track, athletes are “permitted
to participate in sex-segregated athletic activities based on their gender
identity.”131 Washington state has a similar fully inclusive policy,
stipulating that “[a]ll students should have the opportunity to
participate in . . . activities in a manner that is consistent with their
gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on a student’s

126. ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (2017).
127. John Wright, Texas Districts Pass UIL Restriction on Trans Athletes, OBSERVER (Feb. 25,
2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/trans-student-athlete-uil-discrimination.
128. Morgan Shell, Comment, Transgender Student-Athletes in Texas School Districts:
Why Can’t the UIL Give All Students Equal Playing Time?, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1067,
1069–71 (2016) (explaining how individuals seeking to change their gender may hire
a lawyer and file a petition to a judge who has discretion to hear it).
129. Id. at 1070.
130. See, e.g., IND. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, INC., BY-LAWS & ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION 229 (2017) (requiring student-athletes to participate based on their
birth gender); LA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, LHSAA GENDER EQUITY POSITION
STATEMENT 164 (2017) (requiring student-athletes to compete based on the gender on
their birth certificate); Matt Comer, New High School Athletics Gender Rule May Cause
Discrimination, QNOTES (May 8, 2014), https://goqnotes.com/29224/new-highschool-athletics-gender-rule-may-cause-discrimination (last visited Feb. 7, 2018)
(explaining the North Carolina High School Athletic Association’s new rule that
denotes gender based on the student’s birth certificate).
131. CONN. SAFE SCHOOL COAL., GUIDELINES FOR CONNECTICUT SCHOOLS TO COMPLY
WITH
GENDER IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 9,
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_906b9d9cbfa6c81a4ffd5f11e4eef3ce.pdf (last
visited Feb. 7, 2018).
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records.”132 However, in Washington, a student-athlete’s gender
identity is subject to a “bona fide” requirement.133 If a competing
school were to challenge the authenticity of an athlete’s trans status, a
board of officials would review the claim to assess whether the
individual’s trans identity is sincerely held.134
3.

Partially inclusive policies
Finally, some state high school athletic associations have implemented
partially inclusive policies that, in some circumstances, require trans
student-athletes to undergo medical intervention before competing on a
team consistent with their gender identity. For example, the Idaho High
School Athletic Association follows the current NCAA guidelines by
allowing an FTM trans athlete to participate on a boys’ team at any
time, but an MTF trans athlete must undergo a full year of hormone
therapy before she can compete on a girls’ team.135
Similarly, Ohio has a regulation that requires an MTF trans girl to
complete one year of hormone therapy before competing against cis girls;
however, Ohio grants exceptions on a case-by-case basis.136 An MTF trans
girl receiving no medical intervention may play on an all-girl team if she can
demonstrate to the Commissioner’s Office by way of sound medical
evidence that the transgender female student athlete does not
possess physical (bone structure, muscle mass, testosterone,

132. WASH. INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASS’N, 2017–18 OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 32
(2017), http://www.wiaa.com/conDocs/Con1629/2017-18%20HANDBOOK%20Web.pdf.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The Idaho High School Athletic Association adopted a Transgender Student
Participation Policy, which provides:
A. A female-to-male transgender student athlete who is taking a medically
prescribed hormone treatment under a physicians[’] care for the purposes of
gender transition may participate only on a boys[’] team.
B. A male-to-female transgender student athlete who is not taking hormone
treatment related to gender transition may participate only on a boys[’] team.
C. A male-to-female transgender student athlete who is taking medically
prescribed hormone treatment under a physicians[’] care for the purposes of
gender transition may participate on a boys[’] team at any time, but must
complete one year of hormone treatment related to the gender transition
before competing on a girls[’] team.
IDAHO HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASS’N, BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING 3 (2013),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_abe99582bf754cb799b7da48b6981646.pdf.
136. OHIO HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASS’N, TRANSGENDER POLICY 2–3 (2014),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/2bc3fc_10cff228b57342ccb91e4913253d8234.pdf
[hereinafter OHIO POLICY].
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hormonal, etc.) or physiological advantages over genetic females of
the same age group.137

Ohio also stipulates that trans boys receiving hormone treatment must
undergo regular medical testing to ensure their testosterone level is
within a range typical for “an adolescent genetic boy.”138
Because high school athletic associations across states have adopted
inconsistent trans student-athlete policies, these governing bodies are
vulnerable to potential lawsuits. Both trans athletes, who are barred
from participation due to restrictive policies, and cis athletes, who are
put in competition against trans athletes due to inclusive policies,
could pursue litigation.
II.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A trans plaintiff challenging a discriminatory high school athletic
policy will likely rely on both the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments
Act.139 This Section explains how courts are likely to navigate each of
these challenges. Section III.A provides the legal framework and level
of judicial scrutiny courts use to decide Equal Protection Clause claims
involving (1) fundamental rights, (2) suspect classifications, (3) quasisuspect classifications, and (4) non-suspect classifications. Section
III.B explores whether Title IX’s prohibition against sex-based
discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity
and whether trans plaintiffs may bring a successful Title IX claim based
on a theory of sex-stereotyping discrimination. Section III.B.3
discusses how courts have addressed the sex-stereotyping question in
the context of public school bathrooms and locker rooms.
A.

Equal Protection Clause Jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits
states from enacting laws that treat its residents differently for reasons

137. Id. at 3.
138. Id.; see also Charlize Veritas, Men vs. Women—Hormones—A Transgender
POST
(Feb.
18,
2016,
8:51
AM),
Perspective,
HUFFINGTON
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlize-veritas/men-vs-women-hormones-at_b_9234380.html (explaining that the testosterone level for a typical cis male under
nineteen years of age ranges from 240–950 nanograms per deciliter, and the
testosterone level for a typical cis female ranges from 8–60 nanograms per deciliter).
139. See infra Sections III.A–B.
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that do not further a legitimate government purpose.140 When
assessing a potential equal protection violation, a court must first
determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny: strict scrutiny,141
intermediate scrutiny,142 or rational basis review.143 Courts subject
government policies to heightened judicial scrutiny when those policies
infringe upon fundamental rights or rely on suspect classifications.144
1.

Substantive due process and fundamental rights
The Supreme Court has recognized that the “liberty” interests
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment145
extend beyond the rights clearly delineated in the Bill of Rights or the
practices of states at the time of adoption.146 Through the substantive
due process principle, the Court has recognized that the Constitution
protects a number of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy
concerning consensual sexual activity,147 the right to marriage,148 and
the right to reproductive autonomy.149
When a state restricts an individual’s access to a fundamental right,
the policy must withstand strict scrutiny, meaning the government
action must serve a compelling purpose and be the least restrictive
means of doing so.150 Access to interscholastic sports, however, is not
a constitutionally recognized fundamental right.151 In fact, the
140. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
141. See infra Section III.A.2.
142. See infra Section III.A.3.
143. See infra Section III.A.4.
144. See infra Sections III.A.1–3.
145. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
146. Id.; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (explaining
that the protections provided in the Bill of Rights extend to any restraints on freedom).
147. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating a Texas law
criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct).
148. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (ruling that state laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage are unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (striking down state anti-miscegenation laws prohibiting interracial marriage).
149. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals).
150. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1973).
151. See, e.g., Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152, 159–60 (5th Cir.
1980) (explaining that a student’s interest in playing interscholastic sports “amounts
to a mere expectation rather than a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement”
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Supreme Court has consistently held that even access to public
education generally is not considered a fundamental right.152
2.

Suspect classifications and strict scrutiny
When no fundamental right is at stake, a court then analyzes
whether the government policy discriminates against a suspect class.153
Because government policies that discriminate on the basis of race or
national origin typically reflect prejudice, such suspect classifications
need to withstand strict scrutiny review.154 Namely, a court will uphold
a racially discriminatory law only if the law is “suitably tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.”155 Because “[r]acial classifications are simply
too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification,”156 even affirmative action policies
benefiting minorities must withstand strict scrutiny. In Gratz v.
Bollinger,157 the Supreme Court struck down the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate admissions policy that automatically awarded twenty
points toward admission to minority applicants, holding that such a
policy “is not narrowly tailored to achieve the [state’s] interest in
educational diversity.”158 Strict scrutiny review is so exacting that most
laws subjected to this standard fail, leading Justice Marshall to quip that
conventional strict scrutiny review is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”159
and is not protected by due process); Kulovitz v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 462 F. Supp. 875,
877 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (“Participation in interscholastic athletics is not a constitutionally
protected civil right.”).
152. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis
for saying it is implicitly so protected.”); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 230
(1982) (cautioning that “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by
the Constitution,” even though the Court found a Texas statute excluding
undocumented immigrant children from attending public schools unconstitutional).
153. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(listing race, alienage, and national origin as suspect classifications vulnerable to
pernicious discrimination).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
158. Id. at 270. But see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207, 2214 (2016)
(holding that the University of Texas’s undergraduate affirmative action policy
withstands strict scrutiny review because a student’s race is only a “factor of a factor of
a factor” when admissions officers evaluate applicants).
159. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring). Contra Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (dispelling “the notion that strict
scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’”).
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3.

Quasi-suspect classifications and intermediate scrutiny
Statutes that discriminate on the basis of sex, a “quasi-suspect”
classification, need to withstand a slightly less stringent intermediate
scrutiny review.160 To survive intermediate scrutiny, a sex classification
“must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”161 The
Supreme Court has held that a statute is invalid if the objective of the
statute “reflects archaic and stereotypic notions” about sex.162 If the
objective of the legislation is to “protect” women because they are
presumed “innately inferior” to men, “the objective itself is
illegitimate.”163 In United States v. Virginia,164 the Supreme Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause precluded the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), a public military college, from refusing to admit
women.165 Virginia argued that if women were admitted, VMI would
need to modify its rigorous curriculum because most women would
not thrive in an “adversative” environment.166 The Court, however,
rejected this overbroad generalization, concluding that such notions
are “self-fulfilling prophecies.”167 Similarly, in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan,168 the Court ruled in favor of a man seeking admission
to a women’s professional nursing school.169 The Court held that the
school’s admission policy is impermissible because it “lends credibility
to the old view that women, not men, should become nurses.”170
Sex-discriminatory policies are valid, though, when sex classification
is “not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.”171 In Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County,172 the Supreme Court upheld a
California statutory rape law that holds only males criminally liable for

160. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
161. Id.
162. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
163. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (plurality
opinion)).
164. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
165. Id. at 519.
166. Id. at 542–43.
167. Id.
168. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
169. Id. at 722–23.
170. Id. at 730.
171. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 462, 469 (1981).
172. 450 U.S. 462 (1981).
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engaging in sex with a minor.173 The Court reasoned that because the
consequences of teenage pregnancy essentially fall only on girls, the
state was justified in passing a statutory rape law that punishes only
men, “who, by nature, suffer[] few of the consequences of [their]
conduct.”174 The holding in Michael M. established that the Equal
Protection Clause does not require courts to disregard the
“physiological differences between men and women.”175
Besides prohibiting direct sex-based discrimination, the Equal
Protection Clause also prohibits discrimination based on gender
stereotype.176 A state regulation that punishes individuals because they
fail to conform to typical gender norms must also withstand
intermediate scrutiny.177 Trans plaintiffs have successfully relied on a
sex-stereotyping theory to challenge discriminatory policies. For
example, in Glenn v. Brumby,178 Glenn, an MTF trans woman,
successfully sued her boss Brumby for wrongful termination when
Brumby fired her after she began to outwardly transition from a man
to a woman.179 The Eleventh Circuit held that Brumby’s termination
of Glenn from her position at the Georgia General Assembly’s Office
of Legislative Counsel constituted impermissible sex-based
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was
based on Glenn’s failure to conform to traditional gender roles.180
Furthermore, the court added in dicta that Brumby’s decision to
terminate Glenn may have been upheld under rational basis review,
but the action did not withstand intermediate scrutiny.181 In certain
circumstances, trans discrimination is sex discrimination and
necessarily must be subjected to heightened review.182
4.

Non-suspect classifications and rational basis review
Finally, when a government classification is neither suspect nor
quasi-suspect, the classification merely needs to be “rationally related

173. Id. at 475–76.
174. Id. at 473.
175. Id. at 481 (Stewart, J., concurring).
176. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
177. Brumby, 663 F.3d at 1315–16.
178. 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
179. Id. at 1314–15, 1321.
180. Id. at 1321.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1317.
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to a legitimate state interest.”183 Under rational basis review, a
regulation is valid as long as the court can conceive of any legitimate
purpose for enacting it.184 In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc.,185 an illustrative example of judicial deference to lawmakers under
rational basis review, the Court upheld an Oklahoma law that made it
illegal for anyone other than a licensed optometrist to fit eyeglass
lenses.186 The law negatively affected unlicensed opticians who were
prohibited from performing the relatively simple process of grinding
lenses to fit eyeglass frames.187 The Court reasoned that even though
the regulation harms opticians and may exact a “needless, wasteful
requirement in many cases,” the law survives rational basis review
because it could conceivably encourage people to have more frequent
eye examinations, which is rationally related to the legitimate state
interest of public health and welfare.188
However, if the court believes that a classification is “born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected,” a policy that implicates
neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right may be ruled
constitutionally invalid.189 Legal scholars have referred to this slightly
more exacting standard as “rational basis with bite.”190 For example,
in Romer v. Evans,191 the Court struck down an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution that prohibited municipalities from passing
laws that would protect individuals from discrimination based on
sexual orientation.192 The amendment effectively repealed the
ordinances of several Colorado cities, which banned discrimination
based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education,
public accommodations, and health and welfare services.193 The Court
found that the immense harm the amendment inflicted on the gay

183. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
184. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
185. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
186. Id. at 491.
187. Id. at 486.
188. Id. at 487.
189. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
190. See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779–80 (1987).
191. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
192. Id. at 635–36.
193. Id. at 623–24.
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community outweighed any legitimate state interest.194 Similarly, in
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,195 the Court struck down
a provision of the Food Stamp Act that denied food stamps to
households of unrelated persons.196 The legislative history suggested
Congress passed the provision in an effort to prevent “hippie
communes” from participating in the food stamp program.197 The
Court stated in no uncertain terms that a “desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.”198
Thus, even under rational basis review, a policy that is primarily
motivated by animus will not pass constitutional muster.
B.

Title IX Jurisprudence

Along with an Equal Protection Claim, a trans plaintiff challenging
the legality of a restrictive athletic policy will likely bring a claim under
Title IX. Section III.B.1 explains how the executive branch has failed
to provide consistence guidance on whether discrimination on the
basis of gender identity violates Title IX’s prohibition against sex-based
discrimination; Section III.B.2 details how some trans plaintiffs have
found Title IX relief through a sex-stereotyping theory of gender
discrimination; and Section III.B.3 discusses the outcome of similar
sex-stereotyping arguments in cases about trans restrictive bathroom
and locker room policies.
The executive branch’s interpretation of “on the basis of sex” in Title IX
Title IX prevents discrimination “on the basis of sex” in educational
institutions that receive federal funds.199 Determining the meaning of
“on the basis of sex” in Title IX will be central to any impending
Title IX challenge to transgender student-athlete policies.200 The
executive branch has given inconsistent guidance for interpreting “on
the basis of sex” over the past two years.201 In its first attempt at issuing
1.

194. Id. at 635.
195. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
196. Id. at 534–35.
197. Id. at 534.
198. Id.
199. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012).
200. Id. § 1681(a).
201. See generally G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 719 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d,
137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (explaining that Auer deference “requires that an agency’s
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation be given controlling weight unless the
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute”). In
reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court issued a one-sentence opinion: “Judgment

870

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:841

guidance, on May 13, 2016, President Barack Obama’s administration
issued a Dear Colleague Letter202 informing public schools that, for the
purposes of Title IX, sex discrimination encompasses discrimination
based on gender identity: “When a school provides sex-segregated
activities and facilities, transgender students must be allowed to
participate in such activities and access such facilities consistent with
their gender identity.”203 The letter also directly mentioned how a
school should integrate trans students into athletics:
A school may not . . . adopt or adhere to requirements that rely on
overly broad generalizations or stereotypes about the differences
between transgender students and other students of the same sex
(i.e., the same gender identity) . . . [but] Title IX does not prohibit
age-appropriate, tailored requirements based on sound, current,
and research based medical knowledge . . . .204

Although the letter was largely a victory for transgender students,
the guidance still allowed a school to prevent trans student-athletes
from participating on single-sex teams that align with their gender
identity if the prohibition was based on “sound, current, and researchbased medical knowledge.”205 In a footnote in the Dear Colleague
Letter, the Obama administration applauded the NCAA’s only partially
inclusive trans student-athlete policy, noting that NCAA officials
“consulted with medical experts, athletics officials, affected students,
and a consensus report entitled, On the Team: Equal Opportunity for
Transgender Student Athletes” to write its guidelines.206
Yet any hope trans activists may have had that the executive branch’s
progressive interpretation of “sex” in Title IX could be weaponized to
vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for
further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the Department of
Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.” 137 S. Ct. at 1239.
202. Emma Brown, U.S. Senator: Education Dept. Overstepped Authority on Sexual
Assault Complaints, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/education/wp/2016/01/07/u-s-senator-education-department-oversteppedauthority-on-sexual-assault-complaints (noting that Dear Colleague Letters are considered
administrative guidance, which agencies promulgate to clarify regulations that already
exist, and are not new regulations which require soliciting and responding to public input).
203. U.S. Dep’t of Education & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Dear Colleague” Letter:
Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at n.18. But see GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 24–31 (distinguishing in
their On the Team report between high school and collegiate athletics by recommending a
partially inclusive model for colleges but a fully inclusive model for high schools).
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invalidate trans-discriminatory policies was dashed when President
Donald J. Trump rolled back the guidance of his predecessor. On
February 22, 2017, the Trump administration released its own Dear
Colleague Letter making the following statement: “[Transgender
access to sex-segregated facilities and activities] is an issue best solved
at the state and local level. Schools, communities, and families can
find—and in many cases have found—solutions that protect all
students.”207 The Trump administration’s Dear Colleague Letter
further declared that the Department of Education and Department
of Justice have decided to “withdraw and rescind” the Obama
administration’s former guidance on trans student inclusion.208
Without clear guidance from the executive branch regarding whether
trans discrimination constitutes sex-based discrimination, trans plaintiffs
will likely turn to a theory of discrimination based on sex stereotyping.
2.

Title IX protections against sex stereotyping discrimination
Even if courts are reluctant to interpret “sex” in Title IX to mean
gender identity, the statute still protects transgender individuals from
certain forms of gender-based discrimination. Similar to the Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence,209 transgender students are protected
under Title IX because schools may not discriminate against an
individual based on his or her failure to conform to sex stereotypes.210
In Miles v. New York University,211 the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that Jennifer Miles, a trans woman,
could sue under Title IX for sexual harassment even though she is
biologically male.212 The court emphasized that Title IX “does not
207. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Educ., U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos Issues
Statement on New Title IX Guidance (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/
press-releases/us-secretary-education-betsy-devos-issues-statement-new-title-ixguidance; see also U.S. Dep’t of Education & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Dear Colleague” Letter
(Feb. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Trump Dear Colleague Letter], https://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.docx (stating that the U.S.
Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice “believe that . . . there
must be due regard for the primary role of the States and local school districts in
establishing educational policy”).
208. Trump Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 207.
209. See supra Section III.A.3 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination based on sex stereotypes).
210. See generally Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 151–52
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (asserting that a male student who was harassed due to his perceived
sexual orientation had a valid Title IX claim under a sex-stereotyping theory).
211. 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
212. Id. at 249–50.
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[permit] expressing disapproval of conduct involved in the
transformation from one gender to another.”213 Again, in certain
situations trans discrimination is sex discrimination.214
When assessing Title IX claims, courts often rely on Title VII
jurisprudence.215
Title VII protects employees from sex-based
employment discrimination.216 Like Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause, Title VII applies to individuals who are discriminated against
because they do not conform to stereotypical gender roles.217 In the
landmark Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,218 a woman
was impermissibly denied a promotion because she acted too
“macho.”219 Her superiors told her she needed to walk, talk, and dress
more “femininely” to rise through the corporate ranks.220 In Price
Waterhouse, the Court stated that sex stereotyping is a form of sex-based
discrimination: “[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group . . . .”221
In Smith v. City of Salem,222 the Sixth Circuit relied on the sexstereotyping theory established in Price Waterhouse to provide Title VII
relief to a transgender firefighter who was terminated after she
outwardly transitioned from a man to a woman.223 The court held that
Smith had a valid claim under Title VII when her employer
discriminated against her because her appearance and mannerisms
failed to conform to masculine sex stereotypes.224
213. Id. at 249.
214. See supra Section III.A.3 (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination against trans individuals based on a sex-stereotyping theory).
215. See Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“[I]n a Title IX suit for gender discrimination based on sexual harassment of a
student, an educational institution may be held liable under standards similar to those
applied in cases under Title VII.”).
216. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)
(stating that it is an “unlawful employment practice” if an employer discriminates
against employees based on an employee’s sex).
217. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
218. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
219. Id. at 233, 235.
220. Id. at 235.
221. Id. at 251–53.
222. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
223. Id. at 572.
224. Id. at 575 (“[A] label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination
claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender nonconformity.”). Throughout the opinion, the court used masculine pronouns to refer
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Trans individuals challenging a restrictive athletic policy will likely
argue that, like the plaintiffs in Miles and Smith, they were discriminated
against due to their failure to conform to traditional gender norms.
3.

Title IX and transgender student bathroom and locker room access
Because no court has ruled directly on whether a restrictive trans
student-athlete policy violates Title IX, courts will likely turn to recent
cases regarding trans students’ access to bathroom and locker room
facilities for guidance. These access cases have turned on whether the
court views a restrictive bathroom policy as discriminating against
transgender students based on their failure to conform to sex
stereotypes.225 The distinction is important because it determines the
level of scrutiny a court will apply: courts consider sex stereotyping to
be a form of sex discrimination, and any sex-discriminatory policy must
withstand intermediate review.226
Federal courts have split on whether the cases concerning trans
access should be decided under intermediate scrutiny or rational basis
review. In Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh,227 the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that a university policy
that prohibited a trans man from using campus locker rooms
designated for males was not discriminatory under Title IX.228 The
court noted that when a trans student uses a locker room designated
for the opposite biological sex, that student’s action “does not
constitute a mere failure to conform to sex stereotypes.”229 The court
reasoned that impermissible sex stereotyping occurs when a plaintiff is
discriminated against because his or her behavior deviates from the
expected behavior of someone of the plaintiff’s sex.230 A policy that
prevents a trans man from using the university’s men’s locker room,
to Smith, a transgender woman, and identified Smith as being “biologically and by
birth a male.” Id. at 568.
225. Compare Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d
1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that trans-restrictive bathroom policies are
unconstitutional based on a theory of sex stereotyping), with Johnston v. Univ. of Pitt.,
97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 680 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (finding that trans-restrictive locker room
policies do not reflect sex stereotyping).
226. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (granting a
transgender employee relief under intermediate scrutiny rather than rational basis
review); supra Section III.B.2 (discussing sex stereotyping).
227. 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
228. Id. at 661, 682.
229. Id. at 681 (quoting Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007)).
230. Id. at 680.
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conversely, is not based on “behaviors, mannerisms, and
appearances.”231 The restriction is based on a person’s genitals, not
how a person outwardly looks, dresses, or acts.232 Accordingly, the
court concluded the restrictive locker room policy was not sex-based
discrimination under a sex-stereotyping theory, and the policy only
needs to withstand rational basis review.233
The court further held that the locker room policy was
constitutionally valid because universities may rationally prevent trans
men from using the men’s locker room facility to further the legitimate
objective of protecting student privacy.234
In 2017, the Seventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in
Whitaker v. Kenosha.235 In Whitaker, the court found that a restrictive
high school bathroom policy “punishe[d]” transgender students for
their “gender nonconformance.”236 The court, relying on the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Salem, reasoned that “the School
District treats transgender students like [Whitaker], who fail to conform
to the sex-based stereotypes associated with their assigned sex at birth,
differently.”237 Because this was an instance of sex discrimination based
on a sex-stereotyping theory, the court subjected the school’s bathroom
policy to a heightened level of intermediate scrutiny.238 The court
conceded that ensuring student privacy is an important state objective,
but it held that the practice of preventing a trans boy from using the
boys’ restroom is not substantially related to achieving that goal.239

231. Id.
232. Id. at 681.
233. Id. at 668.
234. See id. at 678 (explaining that students need access to facilities which exclude
individuals of the opposite biological sex “to perform certain private activities and
bodily functions”).
235. 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017).
236. Id. at 1049.
237. Id. at 1048, 1051 (relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)). But see infra Section IV.C (arguing that the Seventh
Circuit misapplied Smith’s reasoning in Whitaker and that restrictive bathroom policies
do not discriminate against trans students based on their gender nonconformity).
238. 858 F.3d at 1051.
239. Id. at 1051, 1054.
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IV. TRANSGENDER ATHLETE POLICIES ONLY NEED TO WITHSTAND
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
This Section argues that high school athletic association regulations,
which classify students by their sex assigned at birth rather than their
gender identity, only need to withstand rational basis review.
Section IV.A explains that participation in interscholastic sports is
not a fundamental right, so a state actor can deny a student access to
athletics without establishing a compelling reason. Section IV.B argues
that transgender identity is not a suspect classification requiring
heightened judicial scrutiny. There are significant biological differences
between males and females, and, in certain circumstances, a state actor
may justifiably classify people by genetic markers of sex rather than
gender identity. Finally, Section IV.C argues that trans-restrictive
athletic policies do not punish trans individuals for failing to conform
to expected gender stereotypes—a type of discrimination that would
need to withstand intermediate scrutiny. Instead, restrictive athletic
policies treat trans individuals differently from cis individuals due to
their hormone profiles.
But, even under rational basis review, a court could invalidate a
trans-restrictive athletic policy that is based primarily on animus toward
trans people.
A.

Transgender Students Do Not Have a Fundamental Right to
Participate in Interscholastic Athletics

A state policy that restricts access to a fundamental right must be
subject to exacting strict scrutiny, but courts will not adopt this
standard of review because participation in high school sports is a
privilege, not a right.240 A trans student challenging a restrictive
athletic policy under a substantive due process claim will likely fail.241
B.

Transgender Identity Is Likely Not a Suspect Classification

Likewise, a plaintiff challenging a trans-restrictive athletic policy
under a suspect classification theory will likely fail. Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence suggests that trans identity is not a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification that requires heightened judicial review.242
240. See supra Section III.A.1.
241. See id. (explaining that even access to public schooling is not a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution).
242. See supra Section III.A.3; see also Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (noting that the court
did not need to determine whether transgender status warrants heightened scrutiny).
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Currently, there is no U.S. Supreme Court case categorizing trans
individuals as a suspect class,243 and the Court has been hesitant to
acknowledge new suspect classifications.244 If the Court were to tackle
this issue, it would need to address the following considerations:
(1) whether trans identity is based on immutable characteristics;
(2) whether the trans community has the ability to protect itself through
the political process; (3) whether trans people have historically been
discriminated against; and (4) whether discrimination against trans
individuals likely reflects prejudice rather than purpose.245
The immutability of trans identity is complicated. Many activists
argue that trans individuals diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder
(GID)—currently classified as Gender Dysphoria—have a “psychological
disorder that is considered inherited or unchangeable.”246 Yet WPATH
resists classifying “transgenderism” as a medical disorder.247 By rejecting
a medical diagnosis, WPATH’s position suggests internal conceptions
of gender are fluid, not fixed.248 Ironically, debunking the myth of
strict gender binaries may have weakened the argument that trans
individuals deserve a protected legal status.
Likewise, the question of political power is not clear cut. Inarguably,
trans people lack representation in high-ranking government
positions,249 and conservative politicians have frequently tried to gin up

243. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015) (invalidating
a law prohibiting same-sex marriage under a theory that the right to marry is
fundamental under the Due Process Clause). Although Obergefell affirmed the dignity
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) individuals, the Supreme Court did not
recognize sexual orientation or transgender status as a suspect classification. Id.
244. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985)
(refusing to recognize the mentally disabled as a quasi-suspect class).
245. Shell, supra note 128, at 1059.
246. Id. at 1060–61.
247. See WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 69, at 4 (7th ed. 2011) (insisting
that transgender identity is a matter of diversity, not pathology).
248. Id. at 2, 5 (explaining that standards of care must be “flexible” to meet the
specific needs of the individual and reaffirming that treatment for gender dysphoria
varies based on the person’s needs).
249. See Antonio Olivo, Danica Roem of Virginia to Be First Openly Transgender Person
Elected, Seated in a U.S. Statehouse, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/danica-roem-will-be-vasfirst-openly-transgender-elected-official-after-unseating-conservative-robert-gmarshall-in-house-race/2017/11/07/d534bdde-c0af-11e7-959cfe2b598d8c00_story.html (reporting that Danica Roem, who was elected to the
Virginia House of Delegates on November 7, 2017, will be “the first openly
transgendered person elected to and seated in a U.S. state legislature”).
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political support from their base by attacking the trans community.
For example, in a contentious debate surrounding a trans-restrictive
bathroom law in Houston, Texas, Republican operatives released
inflammatory television ads implying that trans women are sex offenders
and pose a danger to children.250 Significantly, these trans-phobic tactics
have been met with swift and powerful political resistance. Former
Republican governor of North Carolina Pat McCrory lost his re-election
campaign in 2016 largely due to his public defense of a trans-restrictive
bathroom law.251 In July 2017, President Trump attempted a similar
political gambit, tweeting that he would ban trans people from serving
“in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”252 A Trump administration
official posited that the announcement forces Senate Democrats in
Rust Belt states who are up for re-election in 2018 “to make their
opposition to this a key plank of their campaigns.”253 President Trump
may think targeting trans individuals is an easy way to flip Democratic
seats in the Senate, but the fate of former Governor Pat McCrory shows
he may be underestimating the political clout of trans-rights activists.254
The case for historical discrimination against trans individuals,
though, is fairly straightforward. Trans people have routinely been the
victims of harassment and hate crimes, causing disproportionally high
rates of suicide among the trans population.255 Many states lack legal
protections for trans workers, and trans people are twice as likely to be
unemployed and live in poverty.256 Fifty-three percent of trans
individuals also report being discriminated against or disrespected in

250. Aaron Blake, “It Will Be Fun to Watch [Democrats] Have to Defend This”: Why
Trump’s Transgender Military Ban Should Frighten GOP, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/07/26/why-trumpsdecision-to-ban-transgender-people-from-the-military-should-frighten-republicans.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Four district courts issued rulings blocking President Trump’s ban—decisions
upheld by both the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals—and the
Trump administration has decided not to pursue a Supreme Court challenge. As of
January 1, 2018, trans people are authorized to enlist and serve openly in all branches
of the U.S. military. See U.S. Military to Accept Transgender Recruits on Monday: Pentagon,
REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2017, 2:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-militarytransgender/u-s-military-to-accept-transgender-recruits-on-monday-pentagonidUSKBN1EN1LV.
255. Shell, supra note 128, at 1060.
256. Id.
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places of public accommodation like hotels, restaurants, buses,
airports, and government agencies.257
Ultimately, the case for categorizing trans individuals as a suspect
class and granting the group protected status will turn on the fourth
point in the analysis: whether a government actor would likely have a
plausible reason to classify people by their sex assigned at birth rather
than their gender identity. Equal Protection Clause case law suggests
that a government actor might have a legitimate purpose for doing so.
In Michael M., which concerned the California statuary rape law that
only punished men, the Court acknowledged that statutes are valid
when gender classification is “not invidious, but rather reflects the
reality that men and women are not always similarly situated.”258 True
biological differences exist between males and females, and
accordingly, the government is justified in treating the sexes differently
in certain situations.259 Because a government actor may have an
important reason to classify individuals according to biological sex,
logically, a government actor may also have a legitimate reason to
classify individuals according to biological markers of sex—like
hormone profiles and sex organs—rather than an individual’s internal
sense of gender. Thus, a court is not likely to consider transgender
identity a suspect classification.
C.

Transgender Athlete Restrictions Do Not Discriminate Against Trans
Students Based on Sex Stereotypes

Even if transgender individuals are not considered a suspect class, a
trans-restrictive athletic policy would still need to withstand a heightened
level of intermediate scrutiny if the court determines the policy
discriminates against trans students based on their gender nonconformity.
The bathroom and locker room cases show that courts are divided on this
issue. Johnston held that trans-restrictive bathroom policies do not reflect
sex-serotyping discrimination, and Whitaker held the exact opposite.260
The Whitaker court, however, was wrong: trans-restrictive bathroom
policies do not punish trans people for failing to conform to typical
gender norms. In Whitaker, the court based its holding on a

257. Grant, supra note 101, at 5.
258. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
259. See id. at 472–73 (holding that a law that punishes boys but not girls for
engaging in sex with a minor is justified because girls, due to their biology, suffer the
possible consequence of pregnancy and boys do not).
260. See supra Section III.B.3.
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misapplication of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Smith.261 In Smith,
the court presupposed that the MTF trans plaintiff was still biologically
a man.262 After she transitioned, her dress and mannerisms no longer
conformed to the behavior of a traditional man.263 To find gender
discrimination through a sex-stereotyping theory, the court ironically
needed to view the trans plaintiff as an effeminate man rather than an
actual woman.264 For this reason, the court used male pronouns to
refer to Smith throughout the opinion.265 Discrimination based on
sex-stereotyping would therefore only occur if an FTM trans boy was
denied access to the girls’ restroom or locker room at his high school
because he did not outwardly look, dress, or behave as a typical girl.
Impermissible stereotypes need to be premised on behaviors, not
inherent biological traits. The Whitaker court essentially took the
position that the bathroom policy restricting trans students was
impermissible because the school district was relying on the
“stereotype” that a boy needs to have male genitalia to be considered
a boy, and a girl needs to have female genitalia to be considered a girl.
This interpretation stretches the understanding of stereotype so far
that classifications relying on any biologically based sex differences could
be deemed invalid. A government policy creating separate bathroom
facilities for men and women needs to withstand intermediate scrutiny
and substantially further an important government objective. But a
government policy that classifies trans individuals by their sex assigned
at birth rather than their gender identity only needs to be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose.
Yet, even under rational basis review, a policy based on animus is
void. Although the Johnston court was correct in concluding that
restrictive bathroom policies do not discriminate against trans students
based on sex-serotypes,266 the court was wrong to hold such policies
constitutionally valid. A restrictive bathroom policy is neither

261. See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034,
1048–49 (7th Cir. 2017) (analyzing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
and explaining that the discrimination Smith, the transgender firefighter, faced would
not have occurred “but for the victim’s sex”).
262. See 378 F.3d at 568 (referring to Smith as “biologically and by birth a male”).
263. See id. at 574 (noting Smith’s “contra-gender behavior”).
264. Id. at 572.
265. See Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048 n.5 (“We will use the masculine pronoun to refer
to the Smith plaintiff for the purpose of clarity, as this is how the Sixth Circuit referred
to the Smith plaintiff throughout its opinion.”).
266. Johnston v. Univ. of Pitt., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 681–82 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
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rationally related to safety concerns nor privacy concerns. No evidence
suggests that a trans boy using the boys’ bathroom creates a safety risk
for the trans student or his cis peers.267 If school administrators were
to seriously address the concern that students sharing a bathroom with
classmates of the opposite biological sex is unsafe because such an
arrangement would trigger dangerous sexual responses, they would
need to exclude gay students from shared bathrooms, as well.268
Privacy concerns are likewise irrational. Individuals have a right to
bodily privacy such that “his or her nude or partially nude body,
genitalia, and other private parts are not exposed to persons of the
opposite biological sex”;269 however, common sense dictates that
people use the bathroom discreetly, and students concerned with
privacy—trans and cis alike—can use a stall to prevent others from
seeing them exposed.270 Privacy concerns are especially suspect
considering modern-day high school students rarely, if ever, use
bathroom or locker room facilities in a manner in which their genitals
are visible to others. Finally, schools that have implemented trans
inclusive bathroom and locker room policies have not been inundated
with student complaints about privacy violations.271
Instead of promoting safety or privacy objectives, these policies
stigmatize trans students, causing them severe psychological distress.272
Similar to the amendment to the Colorado Constitution at issue in
Romer, trans-restrictive bathroom policies inflict “immediate,
continuing, and real injuries [on trans students] that outrun and belie
any legitimate justifications that may be claimed.”273 School boards
may proffer any number of flimsy rationales, but the true motivation
seems to be animosity toward trans individuals. Accordingly, under
“rational basis with bite,” policies that prohibit trans people from using

267. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 719 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d,
137 S. Ct. 1239 (2016) (noting that school boards are often vague about precisely
whom these policies endanger).
268. See id. at 723–24 n.11 (dismissing the dissent’s theory that potentially
dangerous sexual responses justify prohibiting trans students from using bathrooms
consistent with their gender identity).
269. Id. at 734.
270. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1052
(7th Cir. 2017).
271. Id. at 1055.
272. Id. at 1045.
273. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identity should be
deemed unconstitutional.274
Although trans athlete regulations will similarly need to withstand
rational basis review, the merits of such a potential legal challenge are
not the same. Athletic policies serve a purpose different from
bathroom policies, and as such, they require a different set of legal
considerations.
V.

ANALYZING THE MERITS OF POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO
STATE TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETE POLICIES
A.

Potential Arguments for Imposing Transgender Restrictions

If a court were to hear a case challenging a high school trans studentathlete policy, the case would likely turn on four main considerations:
(1) whether the individual challenging the policy is an MTF trans girl or
an FTM trans boy; (2) whether the single-sex team in question is currently
designated as all-girl or all-boy; (3) the physical characteristics of the
specific trans student challenging the policy; and (4) whether that
plaintiff is likely to enjoy a real or perceived competitive advantage.275
Schools defending restrictive trans athlete policies will likely lean on
the same arguments school administrators use to defend legal
challenges to sex-segregated interscholastic sports more generally.
1.

Preserve athletic opportunities for girls
School officials may contend that restricting trans athletes from
participating on sports teams consistent with their gender identity is
necessary to preserve opportunities for cis girls.276 This argument is
unpersuasive. Allowing trans girls to compete against cis girls will not
undermine Title IX’s purpose of providing athletic opportunities for
females. Courts are divided over whether allowing boys to play on girls’
teams would substantially limit athletic opportunities for girls,277 but since

274. See id. at 632 (finding the amendment’s “sheer breadth . . . so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that . . . it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”).
275. Pilgrim et al., supra note 64, at 528.
276. See Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)
(asserting that if boys were permitted to play on the girls’ volleyball team, “athletic
opportunities for women would be diminished”).
277. Compare Attorney General v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d
284, 294 (Mass. 1979) (holding that fears of athletically superior boys “swamping” girls’
teams if a male plaintiff is permitted to play softball were irrational), with B.C. v. Bd. of
Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that allowing the
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relatively few adolescents identify as trans,278 there is no reason to think
that trans girls will take substantial athletic opportunities away from cis girls.
2.

Shield boys from potential stigma
Some officials may defend an athletic policy that prohibits a trans
boy from playing on a boys’ team as a means of protecting cis boys from
the stigma of losing to a perceived “girl.” Courts have roundly rejected
similar arguments used to prevent cis girls from competing against boys.279
Simply put, the law cannot give legal effect to private prejudice.280
3.

Safeguard against gender fraud
Schools may also argue that policies based on strict sex binaries are
necessary to prevent potential gender fraud. Conceivably, a cis boy
could fake a trans identity to exploit trans-friendly policies and
compete against less-athletic girls. This line of reasoning is entirely
unsubstantiated. Over its forty-year history of sex-verification testing,
the IOC found zero instances of gender fraud.281 Arguments about
gender fraud profoundly misunderstand the concept of gender
identity. The desire to transition is authentic,282 and any belief that a
cis boy would subject himself to anti-trans prejudice to gain a

male plaintiff to play on the girls’ field hockey team would “deny[] females the right
to have equality of athletic opportunities with their male counterparts”).
278. See JODY L. HERMAN ET AL., AGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER
IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2017) (estimating that only 0.7% of American youth ages thirteen
to seventeen, or about 150,000 individuals, would identify as transgender if asked).
279. See Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[I]t is not the
duty of the school to shield students from every situation which they may find
objectionable or embarrassing due to their own prejudices.”).
280. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding that the potential
harms related to the social stigmatization of growing up in a mixed-race family are
impermissible grounds upon which to base a decision in a child custody hearing).
281. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER
STUDENT-ATHLETES
8
(2011),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
Transgender_Handbook_2011_Final.pdf; Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra
note 74, at 289; see also Vanessa Heggie, Sex Testing and the Olympics: Myths, Rumours
(Aug.
2,
2012,
10:21
AM),
and
Confirmation
Bias,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/science/the-h-word/2012/aug/02/sex-testingolympics-myths-rumours-confirmation-bias (discussing confirmation bias and how
suspicions of gender fraud often are proven inaccurate).
282. GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 15 (“Gender identity is a core aspect of a
person’s identity, and it is just as deep seated, authentic, and real for a transgender
person as for others . . . . For many transgender people, gender transition is a
psychological and social necessity.”).

2018]

THE TRANS ATHLETE DILEMMA

883

competitive edge is not based on any credible evidence.283 Furthermore,
if gender fraud is an actual concern, school officials could adequately
address the problem by including a clause requiring that a studentathlete’s gender identity be sincerely held.284 If a competitor were to
challenge the authenticity of a student’s trans status, the trans-athlete
would simply need to provide evidence that his or her gender identity
has been consistently asserted in a uniform matter.
4.

Prevent injury
Schools will also likely attempt to justify restrictive trans-athlete
policies by citing concerns over student safety. No legitimate safety
concern justifies preventing trans boys from playing on boys’ teams.
Courts, like the Supreme Court of Washington in Darrin, typically
permit cis girls to play against boys.285 Some girls are physically strong
enough to compete against boys,286 and the female plaintiffs in these
cases are making a deliberate decision to take on the risk of injury.287
Similarly, a trans boy who has a biologically female body is making an
informed choice to assume the risk of competing against his male
peers. Since schools do not bar small, injury-prone cis boys from
competing over safety concerns,288 there is no justifiable reason for
schools to bar trans boys.
However, cis girls may have legitimate safety concerns when required
to compete against trans girls in contact sports. A trans girl may be
bigger and stronger than her cis competitors, which could pose a
potential risk of injury in sports like wrestling, boxing, or mixedmartial arts.289 Weight classes may offset this danger slightly, but a state

283. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 288.
284. Id. at 289.
285. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (Wash. 1975) (permitting the Darrin sisters
to try-out for the boys’ high school football team).
286. See id. at 892 (“There is no finding that what may be true of the majority of girls
is true in the case of the Darrin girls . . . or girls like them.”).
287. See, e.g., B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(“[W]hen a girl tries out for a boys’ team, she and her parents go in ‘with their eyes open.’”).
288. See Darrin, 540 P.2d at 892 (relying on this reasoning to reject the proposition
that safety concerns necessitate prohibiting all girls from trying-out for football).
289. See, e.g., Ben Popper, Fighting Fallon Fox: The Controversial Science of Transgender
Athletes in Combat Sports, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/
2013/3/21/4131174/fallon-fox-mma-science-transgender-fighting-athletes (detailing
the controversy over Fallon Fox, an MTF transgender mixed martial arts fighter, who
some critics argue poses a safety risk to her female competitors).
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may have a legitimate safety concern that justifies rules preventing trans
girls from competing against cis girls in these high-contact sports.290
5.

Promote competitive fairness
Finally, schools will likely argue that restrictive trans-athlete policies
are necessary to maintain a fair playing field. This argument is
unconvincing when deployed to prevent trans boys from playing on
boys’ teams. If anything, a trans boy is at a disadvantage competing
against naturally larger and stronger cis boys. But a state may have a
legitimate interest in monitoring trans boys currently undergoing
hormone treatment to ensure that their testosterone levels do not
exceed the typical limit.
State athletic associations may have legitimate fairness concerns that
justify rules preventing trans girls from participating on all-girl teams.
Due to natural size and strength advantages, trans girls could unfairly
dominate their cis girl competition. In B.C. v. Board of Education, the New
Jersey appellate court held that average physiological differences
between biological males and biological females justified a rule
prohibiting a boy from joining the girls’ field hockey team.291 Unlike
the previous circumstance where an FTM trans boy is actively choosing to
subject himself to a possible competitive disadvantage, cis girls did not
choose to compete against opponents with male bodies.292 However, the
potential social benefits trans girls receive by playing on girls’ teams could
outweigh these concerns.293 Regardless, requiring trans girls to
undergo hormone therapy to reduce natural hormonal advantages
may adequately address concerns over fair play, especially considering the
trans girls in question would have necessarily begun hormone treatments
before their “male” skeletal structures fully developed.294

290. Contra Leong, supra note 26, at 41 (arguing that girls may enjoy some physical
advantages when wrestling against boys in their weight class, such as increased
flexibility and lower center of gravity).
291. B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
292. See id. at 1066 (explaining that these girls are put in an unfair position because
“they must either compete against [biological] boys or forfeit the game”).
293. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 298–99 (describing the
potential psychological harm inflicted on trans students who are forced to participate
in single-sex activities inconsistent with their gender identity).
294. See GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 16 (clarifying that any competitive
advantage a trans girl may have as a result of prior testosterone levels “dissipate[s] after
about one year of estrogen therapy”).
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Likely Results of Legal Challenges to State Transgender
Student-Athlete Policies

Throughout the country, high school athletic associations have
implemented disparate regulations regarding the inclusion of trans
athletes on single-sex sports teams: (1) restrictive policies require trans
students to compete on teams corresponding to their sex in virtually
all circumstances; (2) fully inclusive policies allow trans students to
compete on teams consistent with their gender identity; and
(3) partially inclusive policies permit trans boys to play on boys’ teams
without restriction but require trans girls to undergo specific medical
interventions before playing on girls’ teams.
This Section analyzes the merits of potential legal challenges to each
approach. First, restrictive policies are unconstitutional because
requiring FTM trans boys to play on girls’ teams is not rationally related
to ensuring student safety and contributes to competitive inequity.
Furthermore, trans girls who have received hormone treatments for
more than a year enjoy no significant competitive advantage over cis
girls, and a policy that restricts these trans athletes to the boys’ team
reflects impermissible animus toward trans students. Second, fully
inclusive policies are constitutionally valid because this approach is
rationally related to creating a welcoming school culture for trans
students, which is a legitimate state object. Third, partially inclusive
policies are also constitutionally valid because the typical trans girl who
has not received any medical intervention could have a size and
strength advantage over cis girls, and restricting her to the boys’ team
is rationally related to promoting player safety and ensuring fair play.
1.

Restrictive policies
Restrictive policies, like those implemented in Alabama and Texas, are
constitutionally invalid. As previously stated, a trans student-athlete policy
must withstand rational basis review to comply with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.295 To be valid, the
discriminatory policy must be rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose,296 but rules that force trans athletes to compete
on single-sex teams based on their sex assigned at birth in virtually all
circumstances fail even this minimal requirement.
295. See supra Part IV.
296. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985)
(holding that the City of Cleburne had no rational reason to deny a permit that would
enable Cleburne Living Center to operate a group home for the mentally disabled).
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Preventing FTM trans boys from playing on boys’ teams serves no
rational purpose. Because trans boys are willing to assume the
potential risk of competing against other boys, concerns over safety are
unfounded. Likewise, concerns over potential stigma cis boys may face
losing to a trans boy are irrelevant because the law cannot give legal
effect to such prejudice.297 Finally, concerns over fair play are patently
illogical. In fact, as Mack Beggs’s undefeated wrestling season makes
clear, a policy requiring trans boys to play on girls’ teams undermines
notions of fair play and potentially harms female athletes. Federal
courts have routinely permitted girls to play on boys’ football and
wrestling teams,298 so there is no valid reason a trans boy should not
enjoy that same right. Even for sports like soccer, which a school
typically offers teams for each gender, relegating a trans boy to the
girls’ team regardless of his ability level is unconstitutional. As the
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n court explained, such a policy
denies a trans boy the right to compete at a high level “solely because
of [his biological] sex.”299 Just as VMI’s male-only admissions policy
was based on overbroad generalizations about women, trans-restrictive
athletic policies are grounded on fixed notions about the capabilities
of adolescents born with female bodies.300
Restrictive policies are also invalid because requiring MTF trans girls
to alter their birth certificates to participate on all-girl teams is
unconstitutionally overinclusive. In Moreno, the Supreme Court
explained that some classifications are so imprecise that the
classification “is wholly without any rational basis.”301 Although trans
girls may have physiological advantages over their cis peers, trans girls
who have received hormone treatments for over a year enjoy no
significant competitive advantage.302 Any policy discriminating against

297. See supra Section V.A.2.
298. See Saint v. Neb. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 684 F. Supp. 626, 629 (D. Neb. 1988)
(wrestling); Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1031 (W.D. Mo.
1983) (football).
299. See Pennsylvania v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975).
300. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542–45 (1996) (striking down the
Virginia Military Institute’s admissions policy because Virginia’s justification for
excluding all women did not meet the “exceedingly persuasive” standard necessary for
sex-based classifications).
301. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (holding that denial
of government benefits to hippies in particular is unconstitutional).
302. See GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 61, at 16; see also supra Section I.C.
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trans girls who are undergoing hormone therapy likely reflects the type
of impermissible animus the Supreme Court prohibits.303
2.

Fully inclusive policies
Fully inclusive policies, like those found in Connecticut and
Washington state, that permit all trans student-athletes to participate
on teams consistent with their gender identity are legally valid.
Ensuring that trans students feel welcome participating in
interscholastic athletics is a legitimate state objective, and fully
inclusive policies are rationally related to pursuing that goal. A
constitutional challenge by a cis girl who was denied a spot on a
competitive team or by a girl from an opposing school who would
compete against a trans girl would likely fail. High school athletic
associations have a legitimate reason to sacrifice “perfect competition”
in the service of greater inclusion.304 If the sport in question is a
contact sport, a female plaintiff may plausibly argue that a fully
inclusive policy puts her in danger because it forces her to spar against
an opponent with a male body; however, a court would still likely find
the policy rationally related to achieving legitimate educational
objectives.
3.

Partially inclusive policies
Finally, partially inclusive policies, like those implemented in Idaho
and Ohio, are constitutionally valid. The justification for allowing FTM
trans boys to compete against cis boys is thoroughly addressed in Section
V.B.1. Under rational basis review, a policy that requires an MTF trans
girl to undergo hormone therapy for one year before competing against
other girls would likely survive constitutional scrutiny.
Affected trans girls are not completely denied access to athletics;
they simply are limited to the boys’ team. Even though many doctors
assert that treating a trans girl as female in some situations but not
others is detrimental to her health and well-being,305 state officials may
rationally weigh the concerns of her cis opponents more heavily. After
reading about a trans athlete like Andraya Yearwood besting her cis
303. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (reasoning that a policy with
motives “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects” will fail
rational basis review).
304. Shell, supra note 128, at 1057.
305. See Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 74, at 298 (“Not allowing [trans
girls] to play on sports teams consistent with their gender identity will only increase
feelings of isolation and despair.”).
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competitors at the Connecticut championship track meet, athletic
association representatives from other states may reasonably respond
by implementing rules that prevent trans girls who have received no
medical intervention from participating on all-girl teams. Ensuring
competitive fairness and reducing the potential risk of injury are
legitimate state objectives,306 and requiring that trans girls undergo
one year of hormone therapy before playing on girls’ teams is
rationally related to pursuing those goals. Courts have upheld
discriminatory athletic policies that promote fair play and safety in the
past.307 A partially inclusive policy is reasonably aligned with Title IX’s
purpose—preserving the integrity of female athletics.308
Even if the policy can withstand a facial challenge, a particular trans
girl who is of comparable size and ability level to her cis girl peers may
successfully challenge the regulation as applied to her.309 To prevent
this, high school athletic associations with partially inclusive policies
should include an exception similar to the one in Ohio that permits a
trans girl who has not received any medical intervention to play on the
girls’ team provided she can demonstrate that she possesses no physical
advantage and poses no undue safety risk to cis girls.310
CONCLUSION
Although both fully inclusive and partially inclusive policies are
consistent with the Constitution and Title IX, athletic policy decision
makers should deeply consider which values they want to promote.
State officials need to balance concerns over fair competition and
safety with acknowledging the dignity and well-being of trans students.
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A policy that requires a trans girl to undergo hormone therapy for a
year before competing against other girls might unduly burden a student
who cannot afford expensive hormone treatments.311 Such a policy might
also pressure a trans girl to pursue medical intervention that she might
not otherwise desire.312 Partially inclusive athletic policies will prevent
a trans girl who decides not to undergo hormone therapy, either because
of prohibitive costs or a wish to maintain her natural hormonal levels,
from making a full social transition if she is barred from playing on
female sports teams. The full social transition is integral to a trans
individual’s emotional health.313 Furthermore, a rule that bars trans girls
who have not undergone hormone treatment from playing on girls’ teams
may effectively “out” a trans student to her classmates.
The NCAA model is constitutional, but a more trans-friendly
approach might be a better fit for secondary schools. High school
athletic associations need to decide whether preventing athletes like
Yearwood from winning girls’ state championships is worth the
emotional toll placed on trans girls who are prohibited from playing
sports with their female classmates. After losing the 100-meter dash to
Yearwood, Kate Hall, a junior who had won the event the previous year,
was noticeably disappointed.314 As Hall fought back tears, she told a
reporter, “I can’t really say what I want to say, but there’s not much I
can do about it . . . . You can’t blame anyone . . . . From what I know
[Yearwood] is really nice and that’s all that matters. She’s not rude
and obnoxious.”315 Hall, through her grace and composure in defeat,
proves that, although at times painful, fully inclusive policies are
necessary to affirm the dignity of trans adolescents. This issue is bigger
than one athlete or one track meet. Interscholastic sports should be
in service of larger educational goals, and there is no more important
lesson than teaching young people that their trans classmates deserve
the opportunity to fully live their truth, including playing sports
consistent with their gender identity.
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